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This paper determines the standard of living reductions that young, middle aged, and older households
would experience were the U.S. government to cut Social Security benefits (but not taxes) to deal
with its well documented (see Gokhale and Smetters, 2005) long-term fiscal crisis.  To determine pre-
and post-retirement living standards in the absence and presence of Social Security benefit cuts the
paper relies on ESPlanner, a financial planning software program.  ESPlanner calculates a household's
highest sustainable living standard taking into account the household's economic resources including
its claims to future Social Security benefits.  The program also incorporates borrowing/liquidity constraints
that limit households' abilities to smooth their living standards over their life cycles. The analysis considers
both stylized single and married households of different ages and resource levels as well as actual
households sampled from the 2004 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  The extent
of current and future living standard reductions in response to announcements of future Social Security
benefit cuts depends critically on the age of the household, when the cuts are announced, the size of
the cuts, the income of the household, and the degree to which the household is liquidity constrained.
For our stylized households on the brink of retirement the complete elimination of Social Security
benefits would entail retirement living standards reductions ranging from roughly one third to one
hundred percent depending on the household's income.  Our SCF findings also point to a strong dependency
on Social Security.  Indeed, 41 percent of older SCF couples and 33 percent of SCF singles would
experience a living standard reduction of 90 percent or more were Social Security benefits eliminated.
A surprising finding is the major dependency of very high-income households on Social Security.
Take the highest earning couple in our stylized sample.  This couple earns $500,000 per year from
age 30 through age 64 when it retires.  It enters retirement with over $2.3 million in assets.  But given
the length of its potential retirement, the modest real return it can safely earn on its assets, its off-the-top
housing expenses, and its tax payments, this household is highly dependent on Social Security benefits,
notwithstanding their taxable status.  Indeed, were this household denied all its Social Security benefits
















270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
prizza@bu.edu  2 
1. Introduction 
 
According  to  a  recent,  highly  detailed,  and  conservative  estimate  by  Gokhale  and  Smetters 
(2005),  the  present  value  difference  between  the  U.S.  government’s  projected  future 
expenditures and its projected future tax receipts exceeds $60 trillion! Closing this enormous 
fiscal gap requires massive and extremely painful expenditure cuts, tax hikes, or both.  Delaying 
such  adjustments  exacerbates  the  fiscal  crisis  and  raises  the  prospect  of  a  major 
financial/economic meltdown, including high and growing rates of inflation if the government 
uses the printing press to “pay” its bills.       
 
The  inevitable  adjustment  to  a  sustainable  fiscal  policy  will,  no  doubt,  involve  a  variety  of 
different tax increases and expenditure reductions.  But these tax hikes and spending cuts need 
not be explicit.  Instead, they may arise by allowing price hikes to outpace the indexation of tax 
and expenditure provisions.   
 
Will Social Security benefits come under the chopping block? Especially the Social Security 
benefits of the rich? No one can say for sure. But what we can say and do study in this paper is 
how potential Social Security benefit cuts would impact the wellbeing of different American 
households.   
 
Specifically, we examine the living standard impacts of immediate and permanent 30 percent and 
100 percent cuts in Social Security benefits.  In so doing, we don’t claim that cuts of either of 
these magnitudes will necessarily arise or that any Social Security benefit cuts will be announced 
any time soon.  Instead, we examine cuts of these magnitudes to illustrate the dependency of the 
population on Social Security and to help policymakers calibrate the cost to Americans of this 
form of policy adjustment. 
 
One may object to our exclusive focus on Social Security benefits in discussing Americans’ 
dependency on the system.  Were Social Security tax cuts coupled with Social Security benefit 
cuts, working Americans would be able to use their tax savings to limit the decline in their 
current and future living standards.  But given Social Security’s fiscal condition, the prospect for 
reductions in taxes earmarked to finance Social Security benefits seems remote.   
 
In determining pre- and post-retirement living standards in the absence and presence of Social 
Security benefit cuts we rely on ESPlanner, a financial planning software program.  ESPlanner 
calculates a household’s highest sustainable living standard taking into account the household’s 
economic resources including its claims to future Social Security benefits.  The program also 
incorporates borrowing/liquidity constraints that limit households’ abilities to smooth their living 
standards over their life cycles.  
 
Our  analysis  considers  both  stylized  single  and  married  households  of  different  ages  and 
resource levels as well as actual households sampled from the 2004 Federal Reserve Survey of 
Consumer Finances.  Given the progressive nature of the Social Security benefit formula, one 
would expect across-the-board benefit cuts to impact low-income households disproportionately 
relative to high income households.  And given that a) benefit cuts have a larger present value 
impact on resources the closer they are to being received and b) younger households have more   3 
time  to  adjust  their  saving  behavior  to  prospective  benefit  cuts,  one  would  expect  older 
households to experience disproportionately larger living standard reductions than younger ones.   
 
These  expectations  must,  however,  be  modified  if  some  households  are  borrowing/liquidity 
constrained.  Compare, for example, two young households that are identical except that one is 
liquidity constrained, while the other can borrow to smooth its living standard.  The liquidity-
constrained household will experience no change in its current living standard from future Social 
Security benefit cuts because it’s not financing current consumption out of those future benefits.  
In contrast, the unconstrained young household will experience an immediate reduction in its 
living standard because it is financing its current spending in part from its future Social Security 
income.  The flip side of this coin is that the liquidity constrained household will experience a 
larger percentage decline in living standard at retirement than will the non-liquidity constrained 
household.      
 
This assumes that the liquidity constraints are, themselves, unaffected by cuts in Social Security 
benefits.  But, as shown here, large enough benefit cuts, by reducing or eliminating the future 
income against which households wish to borrow, transforms borrowing-constrained households 
into non-borrowing-constrained households.  At that point, these households can no longer rely 
on Social Security to finance their retirements and must save on their own.  Doing so entails a 
drop in their current consumption spending and, thus, current living standard.  
 
Given  the  importance  of  liquidity  constraints  for  the  timing  of  consumption  adjustments  in 
response  to  Social  Security  benefit  cuts,  it’s  important  to  show  households’  living  standard 
adjustments at different stages of their life cycles.  This, indeed, is what we do.      
 
Our findings for the stylized households may be summarized as follows.  The extent of current 
and future living standard reductions in response to announcements of future Social Security 
benefit cuts depends critically on the age of the household, when the cuts are announced, the size 
of the cuts, and the income of the household.  Social Security benefit cuts of 30 percent, if 
announced when a household is about to retire, can lead to retirement living standard reductions 
ranging  from  roughly  one  third  to  one  tenth  depending  on  the  household’s  income.    These 
reductions in living standard are substantially reduced if the household learns at younger ages 
about the benefit cuts and, consequently, has a longer time period over which to adjust.   
 
For  our  stylized  households  on  the  brink  of  retirement  the  complete  elimination  of  Social 
Security benefits would entail retirement living standards reductions ranging from roughly one 
third to one hundred percent depending on the household’s income.  This presumes that the 
announcement is made when the household hits age 65.  If the announcement were made when 
the household was age 35, the retirement living standard reduction would range from roughly 20 
to 50 percent.  
 
The most surprising finding in our analysis of stylized households is the major dependence of 
very high-income households on Social Security.  Take the highest earning couple in our stylized 
sample.  This couple earns $500,000 per year from age 30 through age 64 when it retires.  It 
enters  retirement  with  over  $2.3  million  in  assets.    But  given  the  length  of  its  potential 
retirement,  the  modest  real  return  we  assume  it  can  safely  earn  on  its assets,  its  off-the-top   4 
housing expenses, and its tax payments, this household is highly dependent on Social Security 
benefits, notwithstanding their taxable status.  Indeed, were this household denied all its Social 
Security benefits on the eve of its retirement, it would suffer a 35.6 percent reduction in its living 
standard throughout retirement.  
 
Our findings based on the SCF are quite similar to those based on the stylized households.  
Almost two-thirds of young SCF households and over a quarter of middle aged SCF households 
are borrowing constrained.  Consequently, their immediate living standard falls relatively little in 
response to a 30 percent benefit cut, but much more substantially in the case of a 100 percent 
benefit cut.  In the case of elderly SCF respondents their immediate living standards are highly 
dependent on Social Security.  Indeed, 41 percent of older couples and 33 percent of singles 
would experience a living standard reduction of 90 percent or more were Social Security benefits 
eliminated.  
 
We proceed in section 2 with a description of  ESPlanner.  Section 3 describes our stylized 
households and reports the living standard effects of the two alternative benefit cuts.  Second 4 




2.  ESPlanner 
 
ESPlanner determines a households highest sustainable living standard within each non-liquidity 
constrained interval of its life and the consumption, saving, and term life insurance holdings 
needed to smooth the household’s living standard within each non-constrained interval.  The 
program uses dynamic programming in forming its recommendations. Dynamic programming is 
needed to deal both with potential borrowing constraints and with non-negativity constraints on 
life insurance holdings.   
 
The program takes into account the following user-specified inputs: the household’s state of 
residence, current and future planned children and their years of birth, current and future regular 
and self-employment earnings, current and future special expenditures and receipts (as well as 
their  tax  status),  current  and  future  levels  of  a  reserve  fund,  current  regular  and  retirement 
account  balances,  current  and  future  own  and  employer  contributions  to  retirement  accounts 
(with  Roth  IRAs  treated  separately),  current  and  future  primary  and  vacation  home  values, 
mortgages,  rental  expenses,  and  other  housing  expenditures,  current  and  future  states  of 
residence, ages of retirement account withdrawals, ages of initial Social Security benefit receipt, 
past and future covered Social Security earnings, desired funeral expenses and bequests, current 
regular saving and life insurance holdings, the economies of shared living, the relative cost of 
children, the extent of future changes in Social Security benefits, the extent of future changes in 
federal  income  taxes,  FICA  taxes,  and  state  income  taxes,  current  and  future  pension  and 
annuities (including lump sum and survivor benefits), the degree to which the household will 
annuitize  its  retirement  account  assets,  and  values  of  future  earnings,  special  expenditures, 
receipts, and other variables in survivor states in which either the head or her spouse/partner is 
deceased.  
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The  living  standard  of  members  of  a  household  is  defined  by  ESPlanner  as  the  amount  of 
consumption expenditure an adult would need make to enjoy as a single person with no children 
the same living standard she enjoys in the household.  The equation relating a household’s living 
standard per member to its total consumption expenditure takes into account economies in shared 
living and the relative cost of children.
1  Consumption expenditure is defined by ESPlanner as all 
expenditures  apart  from  special  expenditures,  such  as  college  tuition  for  children,  housing 




ESPlanner’s Tax Calculations 
 
ESPlanner makes highly detailed federal income, FICA, and state-specific income tax as well as 
Social Security benefit calculations.  These tax and benefit levels are the only non-user specified 
variables influencing the program’s consumption smoothing calculations. 
 
The program’s federal and state income-tax calculators determine whether the household should 
itemize  its  deductions,  compute  deductions  and  exemptions,  deduct  from  taxable  income 
contributions to tax-deferred retirement accounts, include in taxable income withdrawals from 
such accounts as well as the taxable component of Social Security benefits, check, in the case of 
federal income taxes, for Alternative Minimum Tax liability, and calculate total tax liabilities 
after all applicable refundable and non-refundable tax credits including the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Child Credit.  These federal and state tax calculations are made separately for 
each year that the couple is alive as well as for each year a survivor may be alive.   
 
Given the non-linearity of tax functions, one can’t determine a household’s tax rates in future 
years without knowing its regular asset and other taxable income in those years.  But one can’t 
determine how much a household will consume and save and thus have in asset income in future 
years without knowing the household’s future taxes.  Hence, we have a chicken and egg, i.e., a 
simultaneity  problem  that  needs  to  be  resolved  to  make  sure  that  consumption  and  saving 
decisions are consistent with the future tax payments they help engender.     
 
 
ESPlanner’s Social Security Benefit Calculations 
 
In determining Social Security benefits the program takes full account of the earnings test, early 
retirement reduction factors, the delayed retirement credit, the re-computation of benefits, the 
family benefit maximum, the phase-in to the system’s ultimate age-67 normal retirement age, as 
well as offset and windfall elimination provisions. 
 
ESPlanner’s  survivor  tax  and  benefit  calculations  for  surviving  wives  (husbands)  are  made 
separately  for  each  possible  date  of  death  of  the  husband  (wife).    I.e.,  ESPlanner  considers 
separately  each  date  the  husband  (wife)  might  die  and  calculates  the  taxes  and  benefits  a 
surviving wife (husband) and her (his) children would receive each year thereafter.  Moreover, in 
                                                 
1 Let C stand for a household’s total consumption expenditure, s for its living standard per equivalent adult, ki for the 
number of children age i, ￿i for relative cost of a child age i, N for the number of adults, and ￿ for the degree of 
economies of shared living.  The relationship between C and s in a given year is
i
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calculating survivor-state specific retirement, survivor, mother, father, and child dependent and 
survivor  Social  Security  benefits,  ESPlanner  takes  account  of  all  the  just-mentioned  benefit 





ESPlanner’s calculates time-paths of consumption expenditure, taxable saving, and term life 
insurance holdings in constant (2001) dollars.  Consumption in this context is everything the 
household gets to spend after paying for its “off-the-top” expenditures – its housing expenses, 
special expenditures, life insurance premiums, special bequests, taxes, and net contributions to 
tax-favored accounts.  Given the household’s demographic information, preferences, borrowing 
constraints, and non-negativity constraints on life insurance, ESPlanner calculates the highest 
sustainable and smoothest possible living standard over time, leaving the household with zero 
terminal assets (apart from the equity in homes that the user has chosen not to sell) if either the 
household head, her spouse/partner, or both live to their maximum ages of life.   
 
The  amount  of  recommended  consumption  expenditures  needed  to  achieve  a  given  living 
standard  varies  from  year  to  year  in  response  to  changes  in  the  household’s  composition.  
Moreover, the relationship between consumption and living standard in a given year is non-linear 
for  two  reasons.    First,  a  non-linear  function  governs  the  program’s  assumed  economies  of 
shared living, with the function depending on the number of equivalent adults.  Second, the 
program permits users to specify that children are less or more expensive than adults in terms of 
delivering a given living standard.  The default setting is that a child is 70 percent as expensive 
as an adult.  Hence a household with 2 adults and 2 children is specified, under the default 
assumptions, to entail 4 equivalent adults.   
 
The program’s recommended consumption also rises when the household moves from a situation 
of being liquidity constrained to one of being unconstrained.  Finally, recommended household 
consumption will change over time if users intentionally specify, via the program’s standard of 
living index, that they want their living standard to change.   
 
The simultaneity issue with respect to taxes mentioned above is just one of two such issues that 
need  to  be  considered.    The  second  is  the  joint  determination  of  life  insurance  holdings  of 
potential decedents and survivors.  ESPlanner recognizes that widows and widowers may need 
to hold life insurance in order to protect their children’s living standard through adulthood and to 
cover bequests, funeral expenses, and debts (including mortgages) that exceed the survivor’s net 
worth inclusive of the equity on her/his house.  Accordingly, the software calculates these life 
insurance requirements and reports them in its survivor reports.   
 
However, the more life insurance is purchased by the potential decedent, the less life insurance 
survivors will need to purchase, assuming they have such a need.  But this means survivors will 
pay  less  in  life  insurance  premiums  and  have  less  need  for  insurance  protection  from  their 
decedent spouse/partner.  Hence, one  can’t determine the potential decedent’s life insurance 
holdings until one determines the survivor’s holdings.  But one can’t determine the survivor’s 
holdings until one determines the decedent’s holdings.  
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Dealing with the tax and life insurance simultaneity issues as well as the borrowing and non-
negative life insurance constraints all within a single dynamic program appears impossible given 
the  large  number  of  state  variables  such  an  approach  entails.    To  overcome  this  problem, 
ESPlanner uses an iterative method of dynamic programming.  Specifically, the program has two 
dynamic programs that pass data to one another on an iterative basis until they both converge to 
a single mutually consistent solution to many decimal points of accuracy.   
 
One program takes age-specific life insurance premium payments as given and calculates the 
household’s consumption smoothing conditional on these payments.  The other program takes 
the output of this consumption smoothing program -- the living standard in each year that needs 
to be protected – as given.  This second program calculates how much life insurance is needed by 
both potential decedents and their surviving spouses/partners.   
 
This iterative procedure also deals with our two simultaneity issues.  The trick here is to form 
initial guesses of future taxes and survivor life insurance holdings and update these guesses 
across successive iterations based on values of these variables endogenously generated by the 
program  in  the  previous  iteration.    When  the  program  concludes  its  calculations,  current 
spending is fully consistent with future taxes and vice versa, and the recommended life insurance 
holdings of heads and spouses/partners are fully consistent with the recommended life insurance 
holdings of survivors.   
 
 
3. The Living Standard Impacts of Social Security Benefit Cuts -- Stylized Households  
 
This section examines the costs in terms of living standard reductions of Social Security benefit 
cuts for a set of 14 stylized households.  The 14 households differ with respect to their marital 
status,  annual  labor  earnings,  assets,  housing  expenses,  and  college  expenses.    For  each 
household, we consider the impact of the benefit cuts arising unexpectedly at three different 
points in their life cycle – when the household head and, if married, spouse are age 35, age 50, 
and age 65.         
 
 
Characteristics of Our Stylized Households 
 
To determine each household’s asset levels at ages 35, 50, and 65, we first run ESPlanner with 
no benefit cuts.  Specifically, we run the program for each stylized household specifying the age 
of the household head and, in the case of married households, the spouse as age 35.  In this initial 
run we specify the presence of two children ages 1 and 3.  We also enter age-35 asset levels, 
housing expenses, including the annual payment on a 30-year mortgage, initial earnings, and 
annual college expenses when the  children  are  ages 19 to 22.   Finally, we assume that the 
households’ labor earnings remain fixed in real dollars through time, that the households earns a 
3 percent real (over and above inflation) pre-tax return on its investments, and that the husband 
and wife both have maximum ages of life equal to 100.   
 
Table 1 reports the characteristics of our stylized households as of age 35.  Take, as an example, 
the single household with annual earnings of $50,000.  We assume initial age-35 asset holdings 
equal $12,500.  We also assume annual college expenditures of $12,500 per child, a $120,000 
outstanding mortgage with a $1,500 monthly payment, $1,500 in annual property taxes, and   8 
$750 in annual home maintenance expenses.  With the exception of our $50,000 upper bound on 
annual college expenses, the non-earnings entries for the other households are scaled by their 
levels of earnings; e.g., the single and married households with $100,000 in annual earnings have 
initial assets at age 35 of $25,000, which is twice the initial assets of the single and married 
households earning $50,000 per year.  
 
Continuing with the example of the single age-35 household earning $50,000, we extract the 
asset  levels,  remaining  mortgage  balance  and  length  of  mortgage,  and  remaining  college 
expenditures for this household at ages 35, 50, and 65.  We then use these values as inputs in 
three separate ESPlanner runs for this household at those three ages.  In these separate runs we 
specify, alternatively, no Social Security benefit cut, a 30 percent cut, and a 100 percent cut.  In 
following this procedure we are, in effect, treating the cuts as being a surprise at the time they are 
announced.  We are also holding as much constant as possible in comparing by age the living 
standard adjustments to benefit cuts.    
 
 
Illustrating Our Findings 
 
Tables 2-4 show results from our age-35 runs under the three alternative benefit cut assumptions.  
Specifically, the tables show the levels of consumption, regular assets, and taxes at ages 35, 50, 
and 65.  Tables 5-7 show results from our age-50 runs, displaying consumption, asset, and tax 
values  at  ages  50  and  65.    And  tables  8-10  show  results  from  our  age-65  run,  displaying 
consumption, asset, and tax values only at age 65.  
 
Take, as an example, the married age-35 household earning $30,000.  Table 2, which assumes no 
benefit  cut,  shows  the  household  will  consume  $16,751  at  age  35,  $11,689  at  age  50,  and 
$18,145 at age 65.  The explanation for the lower value of consumption at age 50 is that the 
children have left the household.  The explanation for the higher value of consumption at age 65 
than at age 50 is that the household is borrowing constrained until its late 50s when the kids have 
been put through college and the mortgage has been paid off.  As indicated in the table, the 
household  accumulates  very  little  by  way  of  retirement  assets.    This makes  sense  since  the 
household’s Social Security benefits are considerable relative to its household’s pre-retirement 
consumption expenditure level.  
 
How does this household respond to a 30 percent cut in its future Social Security benefits if it 
learns about the benefit cut at age 35? The answer, according to table 3, is that the household 
continues to spend essentially the same amount it was spending while young and middle age, but 
that it begins saving more in its late 50s and early 60s to mitigate the reduction in Social Security 
income,  which  begins  at  age  65.    Indeed,  by  age  65  the  household  has  $50,194  in  assets 
compared with only $5,435 in the case of no benefit cut.   
 
Consider next what happens if this household learns at age 35 not of a 30 percent benefit cut, but 
of a 100 percent benefit cut.  In this case the household moves from being liquidity constrained 
to being unconstrained and realizes that it will need to cut its current consumption if it wants to 
have as high a living standard in old age as it has when young.  As a comparison of tables 2 and 
3 indicate, totally eliminating Social Security benefits engenders a 23.5 percent reduction in   9 
living standards at ages 35 and 50 and a 50.7 percent reduction at age 65.  These figures are, by 
the way, reported in table 11.   
 
Here  again  we  see  the  critical  role  of  saving  responses  in  determining  the  ultimate  living 
standard impact of cutting Social Security – even for households doing little or no initial saving.  
Indeed, at age 65 this household that would otherwise have saved only $5,435 in assets.  When 
Social Security benefits are eliminated, it ends up accumulating $224,144 by 65.  
 
 
The Importance of Advanced Warning 
 
Learning early that one’s benefits are to be cut can make a big difference to a household’s 
consumption-saving response and to the associated retirement living standard reductions.  This is 
evident once one compares tables 11, 12, and 13, which show the percentage reduction in age-
specific living standards contingent on learning about the future benefit cuts at ages 35, 50, and 
65, respectively.  
 
In the case of the $30,000-earning married couple facing a 30 percent benefit cut, the retirement 
living standard declines by 17.8 percent if the household first learns about the cut at age 35, 23.3 
percent if the household first learns at age 50, and 32.2 percent if the household first learns at age 
65.
2  Note that the 32.2 percent retirement living standard decline is almost twice as large as the 
17.8 percent decline.   
 
The 100 percent benefit cut generates equally striking differences in retirement living standard 
reductions  depending  on  when  the  household  learns  about  the  cut.    For  our  household  in 
question, learning at ages 35, 50, and 65 about losing its benefits leads to respective retirement 
living standard reductions of 50.7 percent, 67.5 percent, and 100 percent.   
 
Clearly, in delaying notification of this household that its benefits are to be cut, the government 
is giving the household less time to adjust by altering its saving.  The upshot is a distortion in the 
life-cycle pattern of consumption.  Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2006) discuss this distortion, 




Patterns by Marital Status, Age of Learning and Earnings Levels 
 
Tables 11-13 indicate some interesting patterns by marital status, age of learning about the cut, 
and  earnings  in  the  living  standard  responses  to  benefit  cuts.    First,  controlling  for  total 
household earnings the results for singles and married households are, broadly speaking, very 
similar.  Second, as suggested above, when the household learns its benefits are to be cut matters 
a lot to its immediate living standard.  Take the 30 percent cut.  Across all earnings levels there is 
essentially no change in current living standards whether the household first learns at age 35 or at 
                                                 
2 The fact that the last figure – 32.2 percent – exceeds 30 percent can be understood by noting that while this 
household’s  primary  income  source  has  declined  by  30  percent,  its  fixed  housing  expenses  (property  taxes, 
homeowners insurance, and maintenance) have not declined at all.  Hence, the percentage decline in consumable 
resources is actually greater than 30 percent.     10 
age 50.  But there is a sizeable drop in the current living standard if the household first learns at 
age 65 of the 30 percent cut.    
 
The fact that benefit cuts, even as large as 30 percent, make so little difference to immediate 
consumption of our young and middle-aged stylized household is testimony to the importance of 
the liquidity constraints facing these households.  On the other hand, if the cuts are large enough, 
they will affect immediate as well as future living standards even at younger ages.  Tables 11 and 
12 shows that if households learn at either age 35 or age 50 that their benefits will be eliminated, 
their current living standards fall by 18 to 28 percent, depending on their income, if they are 
initially age 30 and by roughly 32 to 43 percent, depending on income, if they are initially age 
50.  There are some non-linear living standard reductions in tables 11 and 12.  These reflect 
different  degrees  and  timing  of  liquidity  constraints  among  the  households  as  well  as  non-
linearities in income taxes.   
 
Retirement living standards do, of course, respond substantially to the 30 percent benefit cut.  
But the size of the response depends significantly on the household’s income and the timing of 
the benefit cut announcement.  If the 30 percent cut is first learned at age 30, retirement living 
standards will fall by roughly one quarter for the lowest earning of our stylized households and 
roughly 5 percent for the highest earning.  If it is first learned at age 65, the living standard 
reduction ranges from 32 percent for the lowest earning households to 11 percent for the lowest 
earning households.  
 
The largest living standard reductions occur, of course, in the case the benefit cut is 100 percent 
and is announced when the household is age 65.  In this case, the retirement living standard 
reductions range from 100 percent to roughly 35 percent as one moves from the lowest to the 
highest earning households.   
 
The highest earning households, in table 13, are married households with $500,000 in annual 
earnings.  The fact that such households would suffer a 35 percent living standard reduction were 
Social Security entirely eliminated at their point of retirement is quite striking.  If correct, this 
finding suggests that like low- and middle-income households, high-income households have a 
major stake in preserving Social Security benefits.    
 
But how can it be that such a high-earning household could be so vulnerable to Social Security 
benefit cuts announced at the point of retirement? It’s not for a lack of saving.  The $500,000 
earning married couple arrives at age 65 with $2.3 million in assets.  That seems like a lot of 
money.  But the pre-tax real return the household earns on these assets is only 3 percent, and it 
has a potential retirement of 35 years to finance.  By way of reference, 3 percent of $2.3 million 
is just $69,000 per year.  Of course the household will consume not just principal, but also 
interest on its $2.3 million.  But spending principal plus interest generates an annual income flow 
of just $107,040.  This is larger than it may seem because the household pays taxes on the 
interest and also faces $22,500 in off-the-top housing expenses.  Taxes at age 65 are $38,793.  
They decline, of course, through time as the household runs down its assets and generates less 
taxable asset income.  But midway through retirement, at age 82, they are still quite high, in this 
case $20,904.   
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If one subtracts, say, $20,000 in taxes and $22,500 in housing expenses from the annual income 
flow of $107,040, what’s left for the household to spend on consumption is $64,540.  From this 
perspective, the household’s combined $47,434 in annual Social Security benefits looms quite 
large.  Of course these benefits are, themselves, subject to federal income taxation, so they too 
need to be considered on an after-tax basis.  But these figures are enough to paint the picture.  
They make clear why eliminating Social Security benefits for this household on the brink of its 
retirement  could  easily  reduce  its  sustainable  living  standard  by  35.6  percent  –  the  figure 
reported in table 13.  
 
 
4. The 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance Data 
 
We now turn to the evaluation of the living standard costs of Social Security benefit cuts based 
on actual households surveyed in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board in cooperation with the Department of the Treasury. 
Since 1992, data have been collected by the National Organization for Research at the University 
of Chicago (NORC).  The SCF is conducted every three years and gathers detailed information 
on the demographics, incomes, assets, and other financial characteristics of U.S. families. No 
other U.S. data set collects financial data of similar quality.  
 
The 2004 SCF surveyed 4,519 households selected from all economic strata.  In the SCF, a 
household unit is divided into a ‘‘primary economic unit’’ (PEU) — the family — and everyone 
else in the household. The PEU is intended to be the economically dominant single individual or 
couple (whether married or living together as partners) and all other persons in the household 
who are financially interdependent with that economically dominant person or couple.  
 
In this study, we restrict attention to only those observations in which the number of household 
members coincides  with the number of people  in the PEU.  This sample selection criterion 
eliminates 434 observations (9.5 percent) from the sample. 
 
The SCF incorporates 86 different marital status categorizations based on the participation of the 
spouse/partner in the PEU and the actual presence of the spouse/partner in the household.  We 
include household with one of the following marital statuses: 1) “married, spouse usually there, 
spouse in PEU”; 2) “living with a partner, partner in PEU, partner usually there”; 3) “separated 
and currently single”; 4) “divorced/widowed and currently single”, and 5) “single”. Restricting 
our sample to households with one of these four statuses further reduces our sample size, in this 
case by 77 observations (1.5 percent). 
 
Finally, we considered only households whose heads are 25 and above.  This further reduced our 
sample by 140 observations.  After applying these sample selections, we arrived at a set of 3690 
observations, i.e. a reduction of about 18 percent. From these observations, we choose 200 at 
random, which we entered by hand in ESPlanner.  We entered each observation by hand to 
ensure that each of the inputs for a given household made complete sense; i.e., did not represent 
unreasonable survey responses or extreme outliers.  In the course of arriving at our final 200 
cases, we eliminated 3 observations.  
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Although our 200 observations constitute a random subsample of our selected SCF sample, they 
don’t represent a random sample of U.S. households.  The reason is that the SCF overweights 
high  income  and  high  net  worth  households.  To  adjust  for  this  fact  we  applied  the  SCF’s 
household sample weights in calculating the distributions of living standard reductions arising 





The ages of respondents’ children are not reported in the SCF for privacy reason.  Since these 
ages are critical inputs into ESPlanner, we developed the following imputation strategy. We 
assume children leave the PEU when they turn 19. The age of each child is computed as the 
difference between the actual age of the youngest parent and the mean age of the mother at given 
number of births obtained from the “National Vital Statistics Report” (volume 51, number 1). 
The mean age of the mother is differentiated by the birth order of the child.  
 
Other than demographic information, we collect data on labor earnings, special expenditure and 
receipts,  life  insurance,  financial  assets,  retirement  accounts,  pensions  (current  and  future), 
primary  residence,  property  taxes,  mortgages  and  social  security.  Labor  earnings  are 
differentiated by head and spouse/partner as well as whether, in her primary job, the respondent 
is an employee or self-employed.    Earnings in secondary jobs reported by respondents are 
treated as coming from employment as opposed to self-employment since the SCF does not 
indicate otherwise.  In addition to these procedures, we assume zero growth of real earnings in 
the future.  
 
In  most  cases,  respondents  reported  their  lengths  of  mortgages  in  addition  to  their  monthly 
payments and outstanding balances.  In those cases where the length of a mortgage was not 
reported, we assumed a 7 percent mortgage rate and used the monthly payment and outstanding 
balance to infer the length of the mortgage. 
 
We set the retirement age of a respondent or spouse/partner at the age she indicates she will stop 
working altogether.  If she indicates no plans to stop working, we assume she retires at 70 or at 
their current age plus 1, whichever is greater.    
 
Regular assets are formed by adding together the household’s reported holdings of stocks, bonds, 
checking accounts, saving accounts, and other financial instruments.  For retirement accounts we 
collect data on the account balance, the amount of last year’s contributions, and the expected age 
at first withdraw. The accounts are grouped in four categories, namely Keogh and SEP plans, 
various IRA plans, Roth IRA and others. The category “others” includes all remaining defined 
contribution retirement schemes such as 401(k), 403(b), supplementary retirement annuity, Thrift 
plans,  profit  sharing  plans  and  mixed  (defined  benefits-defined  contributions)  plans.  These 
groupings reflect the structure of the dataset and the requirements of ESPlanner.  
 
The  expected  age  at  first  withdraw  may  differ  according  to  the  retirement  account.    Since 
ESPlanner assumes a single age at which all accounts are withdrawn, we use the expected age 
connected to the largest account.  However, if the household is already withdrawing money from 
one of her accounts, we set the age at first withdraw equal to the current age.   13 
 
In the case of pensions, we collect data on each spouse’s/partner’s benefits, either those currently 
being received or those expected to be received.  The SCF reports information on up to three 
defined benefit schemes for each spouse/partner.  Data on indexation and survivor percentage are 
limited. Consequently, when not reported, we assume no indexation of pension benefits and a 50 
percent survivor’s benefit.  
 
For respondents currently receiving social security benefits, we use the respondents’ reported 
benefit start date and monthly payment. For households not currently collecting benefits, we 
assume that all future employee earnings are covered by Social Security.  
 
Past  employment  and  self-employment  earnings  are  also  assumed  to  be  covered  by  social 
security.  However,  we  do  not  have  data  on  past  covered  earnings.  Therefore,  we  assume 
respondents started working at age 25 and that their earnings grew every year at a 5 percent 
nominal growth rate, ending up in the current year at their reported current earnings levels. 
 
 
The Living Standard Impacts of Social Security Benefit Cuts -- SCF Households  
 
After inputting our SCF data into ESPlanner, we ran the program specifying no benefit cuts and 
then twice again, specifying cuts of 30 percent and 100 percent.  Tables 14 and 15 present 
summary statistics with respect to the derived immediate and age-65 living standard changes 
generated  by  our  sample.    The  statistics  in  these  tables  are  un-weighted.    The  subsequent 
distribution tables employ household weights.   
 
Table 14 shows that average and median immediate living standard changes are much larger for 
older households as our analysis of the stylized households leads one to expect.  In the case of a 
30 percent benefit cut, the median immediate reduction is 13.8 percent versus 2.1 percent for 
respondents age 25-44.   With a 100 percent cut, the median reductions range from 13.0 percent 
for the 25-44 respondents to 43.0 percent for the 65+ respondents.   
 
The medians in table 15, which considers living standard reductions at age 65 for young and 
middle aged households, are much larger than in table 14.  For example, with a 100 percent 
benefit cut, the median living standard reduction at age 65 for respondents age 25-44 is 30.7 
percent  –  much  higher  than  the  median  13.0  percent  immediate  living  standard  reduction 
reported for this age group in table 14.  
 
This is what one would expect given the borrowing constraints facing young and middle aged 
households in our sample.  In our sample, 62.3 percent of households age 25-44 are liquidity 
constrained, 25.8 percent of households age 45-64 are constrained, and 8.8 percent of households 
age 65 and over are constrained.  
 
There  is  considerable  variation  within  each  age  group  with  respect  to  the  living  standard 
reductions. The medians differ substantially from the means, and there is a wide range between 
mean vales and the minimum and maximum values.  The minimum values indicate that Social 
Security benefit cuts can raise living standards for some households.  The explanation here is 
that  the  future  benefit  cuts  lower  the  household  head’s  and,  if  married  or  partnered,  her   14 
spouse’s/partner’s future income and, potentially, the need for life insurance to protect survivors’ 
living standards.  In paying less life insurance premiums, such households end up with more cash 
to finance a higher current living standard.   
 
Tables 16-19 and figures 1-8 display distributions of immediate and, in the case of young and 
middle aged households, age-65 living standard reductions by the age of the household head and 
the size of the living standard reduction.   
 
To begin, consider figures 1 and 2, which plot the data in table 16.  Figure 1 applies to singles 
and figure 2 to couples, whether married or partnered.  Both figures show the percentage of 
households  in  age  groups  with  heads  age  25-44,  45-64,  and  65  plus  experiencing  different 
percentage reductions in their immediate living standards resulting from a 30 percent cut in 
Social Security benefits.   
 
Young households, whether single or married, experience very small immediate living standard 
declines.  Indeed, 79 percent of single young households and 98 percent of married/partnered 
young households experience a decline of 10 percent or less, reflecting the fact that most of these 
households are liquidity constrained.  Middle aged households experience slightly larger, but still 
quite small immediate living standard reductions from the 30 percent benefit cut.  In contrast, 
older households, particularly older single households, are adversely affected to a significant 
degree.  A full third of older households experience immediate living standard reductions of 30 
percent or more.  Among single (coupled) older households, 8 percent experience living standard 
reductions of 40 to 50 (50 to 60) percent. 
 
Figures 3 and 4, based on table 17, repeat this analysis, but consider 100 percent benefit cuts.  As 
we saw among the stylized households, losing so much of one’s future income loosens liquidity 
constraints,  not  because  households  can  now  freely  borrow  against  their  future  income,  but 
because they no longer seek to borrow.  As they see their future incomes fall, large numbers of 
the households in our sample realize they must significantly increase their current saving and 
lower their current consumption spending, often dramatically.  This is true for almost all older 
households as well as many middle-aged and younger ones.   
 
The percentages of older singles and couples experiencing 90 percent or greater immediate living 
standard reductions are 33 percent and 41 percent, respectively.  The percentages of older singles 
and couples experiencing 50 percent or greater living standard reductions are 52 percent and 58 
percent, respectively.  Clearly, the elderly in the SCF are highly dependent on Social Security 
benefits.    
 
Among the middle aged, some 61 percent of couples and 32 percent of singles would be forced 
to cut their living standards by 30 percent or more in response to the announced elimination of 
Social Security benefits.  The corresponding figures for young couples and singles are 10 percent 
and 31 percent, respectively.   
 
Figures 5 and 6 based on table 18 shows how the living standards at age 65 of current young and 
middle-aged households would be affected by a 30 percent benefit cut.  The finding here is that 
close to half of all these households would experience a 10–20 percent living standard reduction.    15 
These reductions in age-65 living standard are modest compared to those shown in figures 7 and 
8 (based on table 19) in which the total elimination of Social Security benefits is contemplated.  
Under this draconian cut, large fractions of young and middle age households experience living 
standard reductions at age 65 and thereafter that range from 20 to 60 percent.  For example, 89 
percent of couples age 45-64 experience living standard cuts of 20 percent or more; and 36 
percent experience cuts of 40 percent or more.  
 
 
Regression Analysis of Determinants of Living Standard Reductions 
 
To  more  fully  understand  the  determinants  of  living  standard  reductions,  we  regress  the 
percentage change in immediate and age-65 living standards arising from 30 percent and 100 
percent benefit cuts against marital status (single or couple), age of the head, the ratio of the 
household’s current living standard before the cut to the average living standard in the sample, 
the square of this ratio, and a dummy variable that takes the value one if the household is 
liquidity constrained. 
 
The results are presented in table 18.  Consider the first two columns in which the dependent 
variable is the reduction in immediate living standards from 30 percent and 100 percent benefit 
cuts.  Apart from marital status and the squared relative living standard ratio, all regressors are 
significant.  Older households experience larger reductions.  Liquidity constrained households 
experience smaller reductions. So do households with higher current living standards relative to 
the average.  The results in the last two columns, in which the living standard reduction at 65 is 





Understanding the living standard implications for working and retired households of cutting 
Social Security benefits requires more than simply considering the size of these benefits relative 
to other resources.  One needs to understand how Social Security benefits and other resources 
stocks and flows combine to determine a household’s living standard time path in light of taxes 
and  borrowing  constraints.    This  study  uses  ESPlanner  to  determine  households’  smoothest 
living standard paths assuming zero borrowing for purposes of consumption smoothing.  It then 
examines how the living standards of both stylized households and households surveyed in the 
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances would respond to 30 percent and 100 percent benefit cuts.   
 
The findings indicate that the vast majority of today’s elderly, even those with very high levels 
of past earnings and large asset holdings, would experience very major living standard reductions 
from such cuts.  Younger and middle aged households would be less affected in the short run by 
a 30 percent cut, since they are largely liquidity constrained.  But such a cut would materially 
alter their living standard in retirement.  The full elimination of Social Security benefits would, 
on  the  other  hand,  significantly  reduce  the  current  as  well  as  the  future  living  standards  of 
today’s young and middle-aged households as well as dramatically reduce the living standards of 
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Table 1  























$10,000  $2,500  $2,500  $30,000  $24,000  $300  $300  $150 
$15,000  $3,750  $3,750  $45,000  $36,000  $450  $450  $225 
$25,000  $6,250  $6,250  $75,000  $60,000  $750  $750  $375 
$35,000  $8,750  $8,750  $105,000  $84,000  $1,050  $1,050  $525 
$50,000  $12,500  $12,500  $150,000  $120,000  $1,500  $1,500  $750 
$100,000  $25,000  $25,000  $300,000  $240,000  $3,000  $3,000  $1,500 
























$20,000  $5,000  $5,000  $60,000  $48,000  $600  $600  $300 
$30,000  $7,500  $7,500  $90,000  $72,000  $900  $900  $450 
$50,000  $12,500  $12,500  $150,000  $120,000  $1,500  $1,500  $750 
$70,000  $17,500  $17,500  $210,000  $168,000  $2,100  $2,100  $1,050 
$100,000  $25,000  $25,000  $300,000  $240,000  $3,000  $3,000  $1,500 
$200,000  $50,000  $50,000  $600,000  $480,000  $6,000  $6,000  $3,000 
$500,000  $125,000  $50,000  $1,500,000  $1,200,000  $15,000  $15,000  $7,500 
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Table 2  
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 35 Households Experiencing No Benefit Cuts 
 
 
Single, Age 35 Households Experiencing No Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  9,172  5,066  8,576  2,707  942  0  (3,235)  770  0 
$15,000  12,119  6,693  10,099  4,089  1,340  2  (3,233)  1,992  0 
$25,000  15,067  8,322  13,338  6,363  265  21,598  224  4,102  0 
$35,000  18,342  10,652  17,776  8,718  0  38,634  3,271  6,136  0 
$50,000  24,918  14,633  23,081  12,604  0  71,759  5,814  9,350  868 
$100,000  42,456  24,821  33,561  25,019  0  246,572  19,229  23,144  4,573 
$250,000  100,414  55,460  55,460  61,138  84,894  1,010,471  55,264  62,515  17,343 
 
Married, Age 35 Households Experiencing No Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 
65 
$20,000  13,405  9,354  15,279  5,827  2,280  901  (1,822)  2,247  0 
$30,000  16,751   11,689  18,145  8,363  1,886  5,435  1,002  4,161  o 
$50,000  24,544  17,127  25,644  13,800  2,162  44,732  5,051  8,305  0 
$70,000  32,719  22,832  33,042  19,145  2,460  91,589  8,815  12,226  834 
$100,000  43,860  30,606  43,276  27,067  3,253  154,035  15,657  19,314  2,972 
$200,000  74,508  51,992  64,938  54,294  6,531  458,719  44,084  47,891  8,898 
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Table 3  
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 35 Households  
Assuming a 30 Percent Benefit Cut 
 
 
Single, Age 35 Households Assuming a 30% Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  9,167  5,063  6,308  2,709  939  9,560  (3,235)  781  0 
$15,000  12,122  6,689  7,965  4,093  1,336  23,901  (3,233)  1,992  0 
$25,000  15,059  8,317  10,889  6,367  261  56,496  224  4,102  38 
$35,000  18,331  10,652  14,622  8,724  0  83,334  3,271  6,136  23 
$50,000  24,904  14,633  19,008  12,612  0  127,641  5,814  9,350  911 
$100,000  42,435  24,821  28,400  25,031  0  316,695  19,229  23,144  4,046 
$250,000  95,179  52,569  52,569  66,402  166,572  1,139,858  55,264  64,268  17,553 
 
Married, Age 35 Households Assuming a 30% Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 
65 
$20,000  13,357  9,321  11,429  5,848  2,237  18,794  (1,822)  2,246  0 
$30,000  16,671  11,633  14,922  8,339  1,845  50,194  1,002  4,161  0 
$50,000  24,444  17,057  21,477  13,755  2,117  105,809  5,051  8,304  0 
$70,000  32,582  22,736  27,782  19,103  2,423  167,303  8,815  12,226  934 
$100,000  43,710  30,502  36,481  27,043  3,231  248,183  15,657  19,314  2,849 
$200,000  74,402  51,919  55,099  54,205  6,399  597,071  44,084  47,886  8,124 
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Table 4  
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 35 Households  
Assuming a 100 Percent Benefit Cut 
 
 
Single, Age 35 Households Assuming a 100% Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  6,736  3,720  3,720  4,896  38,538  92,129  (2,977)  (2,878)  125 
$15,000  9,187  5,074  5,074  7,031  46,840  125,129  (3,233)  2,435  0 
$25,000  12,465  6,884  6,884  9,225  44,916  174,502  (30)  4,491  112 
$35,000  15,645  8,641  8,641  11,417  44,998  225,232  3,271  6,594  481 
$50,000  20,966  11,580  11,580  16,564  66,511  311,457  5,814  10,209  1,283 
$100,000  35,516  19,616  19,616  31,981  112,261  569,986  19,229  24,963  4,225 
$250,000  82,786  45,724  45,724  78,867  358,663  1,445,060  55,264  68,385  18,166 
 
Married, Age 35 Households Assuming a 100% Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 
65 
$20,000  9,487  6,620  6,620  9,514  53,884  165,826  (1,822)  2,650  206 
$30,000  12,820  8,946  8,946  11,983  62,675  224,144  1,002  4,748  25 
$50,000  19,341  13,496  13,496  18,649  89,617  344,838  5,051  9,272  406 
$70,000  25,509  17,800  17,800  25,958  123,991  474,728  8,815  13,505  1,951 
$100,000  33,905  23,660  23,660  36,523  169,141  641,595  15,657  21,587  3,222 
$200,000  56,781  39,622  39,622  71,465  294,192  1,161,141  44,084  52,980  9,364 
$500,000  138,996  96,993  96,993  166,378  1,078,899  3,071,921  125,907  153,531  42,046 
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Table 5   
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 50 Households  
Assuming a No Benefit Cut 
 
 
Single, Age 50 Households Experiencing No Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  3,862  8,197  953  0  782  0 
$15,000  4,821  8,895  1,351  0  2,058  0 
$25,000  5,492  13,046  225  997  3,864  0 
$35,000  6,604  16,641  0  9,538  5,803  0 
$50,000  8,668  21.419  0  33,851  9,055  0 
$100,000  13,550  29,646  0  183,869  21,897  2,524 
$250,000  46,697  46,697  67,559  831,893  59,426  13,584 
 
Married, Age 50 Households with No Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$20,000  6,921  14,589  2,305  868  2,193  0 
$30,000  8,031  17,340  1,886  1,086  4,061  0 
$50,000  11,190  23,399  2,138  10,895  7,972  0 
$70,000  14,039  30,150  2,394  32,864  12,206  0 
$100,000  18,572  39,000  3,163  82,526  18,728  776 
$200,000  27,678  55,255  4,942  347,845  45,483  6,590 
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Table 6  
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 50 Households 
Assuming a 30 Percent Benefit Cut 
 
 
Single, Age 50 Households Assuming a 30 Percent Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  3,862  5,775  953  3,743  782  0 
$15,000  4,821  6,797  1,353  16,823  2,058  0 
$25,000  5,492  10,320  225  33,883  3,864  0 
$35,000  6,604  13,383  0  54,780  5,803  20 
$50,000  8,668  17,431  0  88,995  9,055  0 
$100,000  13,550  24,697  0  250,957  21,897  2,670 
$250,000  42,291  42,291  71,965  899,936  59,426  12,954 
 
Married, Age 50 Households Assuming a 30 Percent Benefit Cut 
 
Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$20,000  6,954  10,347  2,303  8,669  2,193  0 
$30,000  8,049  13,303  1,855  29,106  4,061  0 
$50,000  11,358  19,149  2,142  69,402  7,810  0 
$70,000  14,027  24,978  2,394  108,987  12,206  0 
$100,000  18,539  32,440  3,165  176,048  18,728  676 
$200,000  27,650  47,032  4,943  462,519  45,483  6,157 
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Table 7  
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 50 Households 





Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  2,215  2,215  2,606  58,002  782  0 
$15,000  2,863  2,863  3,319  77,824  2,058  81 
$25,000  4,424  4,424  1,297  120,773  3,864  0 
$35,000  5,801  5,801  807  164,076  5,803  316 
$50,000  7,880  7,880  792  223,203  9,055  465 
$100,000  13,242  13,242  310  408,400  21,897  2,369 




Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$20,000  4,169  4,169  5,162  110,313  2,193  0 
$30,000  5,635  5,635  4,404  152,025  4,061  0 
$50,000  8,501  8,501  5,157  238,171  7,810  358 
$70,000  11,441  11,441  5,182  318,888  12,206  195 
$100,000  15,319  15,319  7,949  446,987  17,459  1,683 
$200,000  24,987  24,987  8,084  787,382  45,483  4,913 
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Table 8   
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 65 Households  





Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$10,000  8,612  0  0 
$15,000  10,703  2  0 
$25,000  15,103  22,246  0 
$35,000  18,098  39,606  0 
$50,000  21,312  73,808  0 
$100,000  29,279  254,725  1,939 




Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$20,000  15,569  796  0 
$30,000  19,534  5,481  0 
$50,000  27,825  45,829  0 
$70,000  34,384  94,158  0 
$100,000  40,456  158,919  224 
$200,000  55,247  472,290  6,298 
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Table 9   
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 65 Households  





Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$10,000  5,893  0  0 
$15,000  7,289  2  0 
$25,000  10,541  22,246  0 
$35,000  12,742  39,606  0 
$50,000  15,261  73,808  0 
$100,000  22,990  254,690  1,148 




Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$20,000  10,555  592  0 
$30,000  13,238  5,226  0 
$50,000  19,407  45,555  0 
$70,000  24,498  93,762  0 
$100,000  29,541  158,317  0 
$200,000  42,989  472,630  4,483 
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Table 10   
Consumption, Assets, and Taxes of Age 65 Households  





Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$10,000  0  0  0 
$15,000  0  0  0 
$25,000  0  0  0 
$35,000  245  39,606  0 
$50,000  1,141  73,808  0 
$100,000  6,953  254,557  716 




Consumption ($)  Regular Assets ($)  Taxes ($)  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65  Age 65 
$20,000  0  0  0 
$30,000  0  0  0 
$50,000  0  0  0 
$70,000  1,123  92,992  0 
$100,000  2,744  157,653  0 
$200,000  12,204  473,115  1,579 
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Table 11   
Percentage Reduction in Living Standard of Age 35 Households  





30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  0.1%  0.1%  26.4%  26.6%  26.6%  56.6% 
$15,000  0.1%  0.1%  21.1%  24.2%  24.2%  49.8% 
$25,000  0.1%  0.1%  18.4%  17.3%  17.3%  48.4% 
$35,000  0.1%  0%  17.7%  14.7%  18.9%  51.4% 
$50,000  0.1%  0%  17.6%  15.9%  20.9%  49.8% 
$100,000  0%  0%  15.4%  16.3%  21.0%  41.6% 




30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65  Age 35  Age 50  Age 65 
$20,000  0.4%  0.4%  25.2%  29.2%  29.2%  56.7% 
$30,000  0.5%  0.5%  17.8%  23.5%  23.5%  50.7% 
$50,000  0.4%  0.4%  16.2%  21.2%  21.2%  47.4% 
$70,000  0.4%  0.4%  15.9%  22.0%  22.0%  46.1% 
$100,000  0.3%  0.3%  15.7%  22.7%  22.7%  45.3% 
$200,000  0.1%  0.1%  15.2%  23.8%  23.8%  39.0% 
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Table 12   
Percentage Reductions in Living Standard of Age 50 Households  
Assuming 30 and 100 Percent Benefit Cuts 
 
 
Single, Age 50 Households’ Percentage  
 
Decline in Living Standard 
 
30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$10,000  0%  29.5%  42.6%  73.0% 
$15,000  0%  23.6%  40.6%  67.8% 
$25,000  0%  20.9%  19.4%  66.1% 
$35,000  0%  19.6%  12.2%  65.1% 
$50,000  0%  18.6%  9.1%  63.2% 
$100,000  0%  16.7%  2.3%  55.3% 
$250,000  9.4%  9.4%  31.9%  31.9% 
 
Married, Age 50 Households’ Percentage Decline in Living 
Standard 
 
30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total Household 
Income  Age 50  Age 65  Age 50  Age 65 
$20,000  -0.5%  29.1%  39.8%  71.4% 
$30,000  -0.2%  23.3%  29.8%  67.5% 
$50,000  -1.5%  18.2%  24.0%  63.7% 
$70,000  0.1%  17.2%  18.5%  62.1% 
$100,000  0.2%  16.8%  17.5%  60.7% 
$200,000  0.1%  14.9%  9.7%  54.8% 
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Table 13   
Percentage Reductions in Living Standard of Age 50 Households  
Assuming 30 and 100 Percent Benefit Cuts 
 
 
Single, Age 65 Households’ Percentage 
  
Decline in Living Standard 
 
30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65 
$10,000  31.6%  100% 
$15,000  31.9%  100% 
$25,000  30.2%  100% 
$35,000  29.6%  98.6% 
$50,000  28.4%  94.6% 
$100,000  21.5%  76.3% 
$250,000  11.6%  39.3% 
 
Married, Age 65 Households’ Percentage  
 
 
Decline in Living Standard 
 
30% Benefit Cut  100% Benefit Cut  Total 
Household 
Income  Age 65  Age 65 
$20,000  32.2%  100% 
$30,000  32.2%  100% 
$50,000  30.3%  100% 
$70,000  28.8%  96.7% 
$100,000  26.8%  93.2% 
$200,000  22.2%  77.9% 
$500,000  10.5%  35.6% 
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￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿’, ￿ ￿ , ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’% ￿ ￿ % ￿’( ￿ ￿ ( ￿’8￿ ￿ 8￿’9￿ ￿ 9￿’:￿ ￿ ;:￿ ￿ ￿0￿￿￿￿
, % ’￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ % (  ￿ %  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ % ’( ￿ ￿ (  ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
, % ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
!￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ % ’( ￿ ￿ (  ￿ , ￿ ￿ %  ￿ , : ￿ 9 ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
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!￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
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￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿9￿
￿
&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿-$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿
￿
￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿
"#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
 ￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿#￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% % ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿#￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿
)￿ (￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% % ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% % ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿
 ￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿
+￿￿￿& ,-"+./￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
*Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1 
￿￿ .￿￿-￿￿’’￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
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Figure 2 
COUPLES - Immediate Living Standard Reductions 
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* ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿
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Figure 3 
SINGLES - Immediate Living Standard Reduction 









)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
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* ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿
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Figure 4 
COUPLES - Immediate Living Standard Reduction 
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* ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿
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Figure 5 
SINGLES - Age-65 Living Standard Reduction
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Figure 6 
COUPLES - Age-65 Living Standard Reduction 
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Figure 7 
SINGLES - Age-65 Living Standard Reduction 
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Figure 8 
COUPLES - Age-65 Living Standard Reduction
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